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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Venezuela has become an increasingly important country to a world dependent on 
oil. Due to its vast oil reserves, estimated to be the largest in the Western Hemisphere for 
light and heavy crude and the largest in the world for extra-heavy crude, the country has 
the opportunity to capitalize on its natural resource riches both to improve the standard of 
living of its people and to become a leader on the world stage. These are the stated goals 
of its elected President, Hugo Chávez, who has held power since 1998. However, there 
are significant signs that Chávez is not meeting those goals but rather is devoting his 
efforts to retaining personal power. This thesis will explore how Chávez came to power, 
and how he is changing established Venezuelan institutions in an effort to control this 
power and the prospects that these changes will enable him to control power in the future.   
Under Chávez, “the Venezuelan state controls the wealth produced by its 
petroleum and other industries, and is the principal distributor of the surpluses generated 
in a highly regulated and subsidized economy.”1 Because of a growing demand for oil 
during most of his tenure, Venezuela has enjoyed increased revenues that Chávez has 
been able to direct towards vast social programs which benefit the country’s lower 
classes, his source of support. However, many critics and observers question both the 
efficacy and the sustainability of these practices.  
Although the military does not currently run Venezuela, the history of the country 
is rife with military control of the government. From Venezuela’s independence in 1821 
                                                 
1
 Manwaring, Max G. “Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare.” 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College (October 2005):  4. 
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until a coup against the dictatorial president Marcos Pérez Jiménez and the following 
military junta, over twenty different constitutions were drafted and ignored, and the 
country witnessed more than fifty armed revolts.2 As a result, unlike American ideas of 
democracy, Venezuelan democracy has evolved in a more totalitarian manner, derived 
from the Rousseauian model “wherein the individual surrenders his rights and personal 
interests to the state in return for the strict enforcement of social harmony and the 
General Will.”3 
After these many years dominated by military strongmen, Venezuela finally 
moved towards becoming a stable participatory democracy with the 1958 Pact of Punto 
Fijo, which marked the beginning of a new political system. The pact created an alliance 
between business owners, the Church, the armed forces, and trade unions, but worked to 
distance the political regime from large parts of society.4 Although subject to criticism, 
this alliance led to stability for the country because it fostered consensus building and 
“cooperation between political part[ies]…”5 This system of a sharing of power among the 
major influence groups and their political parties remained in place until the election of 
Chávez. Thus, while the oldest generations of Venezuelans have some familiarity with 
military dominated government, most current citizens do not.   
 
Hugo Chávez 
                                                 
2
 Ibid., 3. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Figueroa, Víctor M. “The Bolivarian Government of Hugo Chávez: Democratic Alternative for Latin 
America?” Critical Sociology Vol. 32, No. 1 (2006): 201. 
5
 DiJohn, Johnathan. “The Political Economy of Economic Liberalisation in Venezeula.” Crisis States 
Working Papers Program 46 (June 2004): 2. 
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Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías was born in July 1954 to a poor family in Sabaneta in 
the Venezuelan state of Barinas. The future leader was the second of six sons in a family 
that often found itself facing financial difficulties.6 At an early age, Chávez and one of 
his brothers were sent to live with his father’s mother, causing Chávez to become very 
close to his grandmother. He often tells stories about his impoverished upbringing, fondly 
focusing on this grandmother’s affection, love, and the lessons that he learned from her 
which helped shaped his character.7 However, the emotional impact of this positive love 
and affection from his grandmother is countered by Chávez’s negative relationship with 
his mother. In fact, some observers suggest that because of that difficult relationship 
Chávez suffers from “a perpetual aggression that they believe stems from a deep-seated 
resentment regarding his early childhood experiences.”8   
One episode from his childhood that seems to have had a particular impact on 
Chávez was that on his first day of school he was not allowed into his classroom because 
he was not wearing shoes but rather was wearing old canvas slippers, all that his family 
could afford.9 It is not hard to imagine that this incident  might have seriously impacted 
Chávez’s development. As a prominent Venezuelan psychiatrist who became friendly 
with Chávez has noted, he “feels genuine scorn for oligarchic people” and “exhibits, an 
evident bipolarity, of an affinity for the humble and a rejection of the all powerful.”10 
This story, coupled with the view that “Hugo Chávez has harbored grand, enduring 
ambitions since he was a very young man,” provides insight and possible explanations for 
                                                 
6 Marcano, Cristina, and Alberto Barrera Tyszka. Hugo Chávez: The Definitive Biography of Venezuela’s 
Controversial President. Translated by Kristina Cordero. (New York: Random House, 2007), 8. 
7
 Ibid., 9. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid., 12. 
10Ibid., 13. 
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the driving force behind his future political ambitions and his current drive to retain 
power.11 
As it did for many people in Venezuela’s lower classes, the 1959 Cuban 
Revolution and its aftermath made a deep impression on Hugo Chávez. Fidel Castro’s 
success and the help that he sent to Venezuelan rebel groups sparked several unsuccessful 
coup attempts in 1962, and although he was just a boy at the time, Chávez claims that 
these coup attempts encouraged him to become a leftist activist.12 Chávez was part of a 
politically active family and he followed the exploits of both Castro and Che Guevara.13 
Likewise, Chávez was aware of the leading rebels in Venezuela in the years following the 
Cuban coup attempts including Douglas Bravo. Bravo and the leaders of radical political 
groups, such as the Venezuelan Revolutionary Party (PRV), believed that it was essential 
for these groups to “work with nationalistic sectors within the armed forces in order to 
build a revolutionary military-civilian alliance,” and these ideas influenced Chávez .14 
In 1971 at the age of seventeen, Hugo Chávez entered in the Venezuelan Military 
Academy, a competitive and well respected school.15 Chávez was not alone being a cadet 
from the lower classes at the Academy because the Venezuelan Army had a tradition of 
being “made up of a strong working-and lower- class components, its barracks filled with 
men from humble backgrounds drawn by the real possibility of ascending to the highest 
                                                 
11
 Ibid., xv. 
12
 Ibid., 44. 
13
 Post, Jerrold M. “El Fenomeno Chávez: Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, Modern Day Bolívar.” USAF 
Counterproliferation Center, Counterproliferation Paper No. 39 (March 2007).2. 
14
 Lapper, Richard. “Venezuela and the Rise of Chávez: A Background Discussion Paper.” Council on 
Foreign Relations November 22, 2005. Accessed on September 10, 2010. 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/9269/venezuela_and_the_rise_of_chavez.html. 1. 
15
 Ibid., 1; Post 3. 
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ranks.”16 Unlike the armies of many other South American nations, officers in the 
Venezuelan army often came from the lower middle class, resulting in officers more 
likely to be accepting of left-wing ideas.17 Thus, while at the Academy, Chávez formed 
connections with other, like-minded cadets.  
Over the years, Chávez has given two reasons for attending the military school. 
The first is that the school had a good baseball team, and baseball was his first love.18 
The other, more politically motivated claim is that because of the role of the military in 
the 1962 coup attempts, he felt that he could work within the military to reach his 
revolutionary goals.19 This reason is plausible because Chávez would have been aware of 
the successful coups that left-wing military officers had lead in neighboring countries like 
Panama and Honduras in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.20 Whichever reason is accurate 
(both may be correct), Chávez developed friendships with other young officers at the 
Academy which would help him through the next twenty-five years on his road to power.  
While Chávez attended the Academy, Venezuela was led by left-of-center 
governments including that of Christian Democrat Rafael Caldera. For this reason, the 
school encouraged visits from military leaders of other South American countries that 
were working to pull away from American military influence.21 Chávez apparently was 
inspired by these left wing military officers and their successes and has said that he 
particularly was impressed with General Juan Velasco Alvarado who Chávez met while 
Alvarado was serving as Peru's President.22  
                                                 
16
 Marcano 30. 
17
 Lapper 1 
18
 Post 3 
19
 Marcano 28 
20
 Lapper 1 
21
 Marcano 35 
22
 Ibid. 
10 
 
 
While in school, Chávez used his free time to travel home to Barinas and there he 
met with his friends, many of whom had become Communists, and with his brother, who 
was activel involved with radical left wing groups.23 Thus, Chávez became more 
radicalized as he met other young officers and civilians with similar political views, and 
one commentator believes that it was during his time at the Academy that Chávez 
adopted his version of Bravo’s idea of the power of a revolutionary alliance between 
civilian activists and military officers.24  
Following graduation, Chávez carefully built alliances with revolutionary and 
anti-government groups. However, he was very careful to hide subversive acts from his 
military commanders. “In the presence of military superiors, he would feign obedience 
and discipline” and even with most members of his family he tried to appear to be 
apolitical.25 Chávez did share his true revolutionary character with his older brother, 
Adán, who at that time was a physics professor who still was active in a number of 
revolutionary groups. It was through his brother that Chávez was able to meet with 
Bravo, and as as they met over the next few years, Chávez continued to adopt many of 
Bravo’s revolutionary ideas.26  
 These ties to his family and his home continue to be important to President 
Chávez. “Of all Venezuelan presidents, however, Chávez has most consistently invoked 
the spirit of the region from which he comes, frequently peppering his speeches with 
 personal anecdotes, cultural references, and songs relating to the plains and its 
                                                 
23 Marcano 37. 
24
 Post 3. 
25
 Marcano 43. 
26
 Ibid., 46. 
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inhabitants.”27 Rather than catering to Venezuela’s financial and cultural elite, Chávez 
has tried to maintain his image as a blunt, fearless man of the people.  
 
Bolivarianism 
 Of all of the influences on Chávez , the greatest appears to be Simón Bolívar, a 
19th century revolutionary who was born in Caracas, Venezuela and went on to lead the 
fight of independence against Spain. More than any other country in South America, 
Venezuela has kept alive the memory of Bolívar’s legendary exploits and its people are 
drawn to his ideals.28 Whether to be politically expedient or from true admiration, Chávez 
has adopted Bolívar as his personal hero. 
 Bolívar defeated the Spanish and gained independence for Venezuela in 1811; 
over the next fifteen years he fought to gain independence for other South American 
countries. Like Bolívar, Chávez is a mestizo and spent his early years in poverty.29 
Perhaps, most importantly for Chávez, his idol “dreamed of a configuration of free 
Spanish American states.”30 Chávez’s use of the Bolívar legend is not surprising and it 
strikes a responsive chord with many of his countrymen because Bolívar has been “an 
important reference point” for Venezuelan institutions, particularly the armed forces.31  
More particularly, as defined by Chávez, the goals of Bolivarianism, which means 
“Bolivarian Revolution,” are to develop the potential of Venezuela and its neighbors by 
working to achieve “South American political-economic integration and grandeza 
                                                 
27
 Ibid., 7. 
28
 Lapper 1. 
29
 Post 1. 
30
 McCaughan, Michael. The Battle of Venezuela. New York: Seven Stories Press, 2005. 44. 
31
 Lapper 2. 
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(magnificence), to reduce U.S. hegemony in the region, and to change the geopolitical 
map of the Western Hemisphere.”32 Various leaders in Venezuela as well as the rest of 
Latin America have claimed to be working towards this Bolivarian ideal, however, their 
methods and means to achieve them have been inconsistent and no one has aligned 
himself with Bolívar’s memory as strongly as Chávez.  
 Chávez’s Bolivarian program consists of three main goals. First is the “recovery 
and expansion of the state’s ability to intervene in the economic process.”33 Second is the 
desire to improve the standard of living of the masses.34 Third, is the radical 
transformation of the political system.35 One reason this third part is important to 
Chávez’s political agenda is because of his belief that the poor, working classes have no 
representatives in the government with which to ally.36 
 Some critics have argued that Chávez’s Bolivarianism is really just a form of neo-
populism. These critics believe ‘Bolivarian Neopopulism” is a more accurate description 
because Chávez’s current application of his Bolivarian program “lacks a well-defined 
basis in the organized working class and instead takes unorganized, state dependent 
popular or marginalized groups as its main referent.”37 For example, Former President of 
Brazil Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who has a negative opinion of Chávez, does believe 
that Chávez is a revolutionary, but he doubts Chávez’s true understanding of the concept 
of Bolivarianism: “The problem is that he does not exactly know what it is. It exists only 
                                                 
32
 Manwaring 2. 
33
 Figueroa 200. 
34
 Ibid.  
35
 Ibid. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Hidalgo, Manuel. “Hugo Chávez’s “Petro-Socialism.” Journal of Democracy Vol. 20, No. 2 (April 
2009): 79. 
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as a slogan called bolivarianismo, which means nothing and serves only as a base to 
throw Venezuela’s future out the window.”38 
 
Structure of Thesis 
 This thesis examines the past, current, and future role of Hugo Chávez in 
Venezuelan politics. This introductory chapter briefly explaining the political history of 
Venezuela, Hugo Chávez’s coming of age as a military officer, and Bolivarianism ideals 
is intended to provide the background information for this analysis of the impact of 
Chávez on Venezuela and whether he will be able to continue to control that country. 
Chapter Two focuses on Chávez’s path to power with particular emphasis on his political 
and military connections as well as his popularity with the working classes. Chapter 
Three provides a critical look at how this President has managed to sustain power over 
the past decade. Looking towards the future, Chapter Four outlines the major threats 
facing the Chávez regime as it struggles to defeat its opposition and consolidate power. 
Finally, Chapter Five concludes with on overview of the thesis and an outlook for 
Chávez’s future as a modern day caudillo. “It is increasingly apparent that President 
Chávez equates popular democracy to Venezuela with personal immobility in executive 
power,” and it is important and timely to look at how this decision will impact his future 
as President of Venezuela.39  
 
 
                                                 
38
 Manwaring 7 
39
 Walser, Ray. “Hugo Chavez’s Praetorian Guards.” The Heritage Foundation November 12, 2010. 
Accessed on November 14, 2010.  http://blog.heritage.org/2010/11/12/hugo-chavezs-praetorian-guards/. 1. 
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Chapter 2: Gaining Power 
Venezuela’s oil wealth produced revenues of three hundred billion dollars from 
1958 to 1998.40 This incredible revenue stream provided some level of prosperity for the 
country and “despite corruption and mismanagement” of numerous elected 
administrations gave “most citizens a minimal stake in the two-party system.”41 
However, by the late 1980’s the economy collapsed as Venezuela’s population increased 
and its oil revenues per capita eroded.42 
The worldwide decline in oil prices in the late 1980’s led to increasing political 
and social tensions in Venezuela. To combat the decreasing oil revenues, the government 
of President Carlos Andrés Pérez “proposed cuts in subsidies on domestic petrol and 
diesel prices.”43 This decision, which hit the poor particularly hard, led to workers’ 
strikes, which then resulted “in massive rioting and the deaths of several dozen people in 
Caracas in February 1989.”44 This massacre, which is known as the Caracazo, left a 
permanent stain on both the government and the country’s powerful elites.  
The Pérez government never recovered from its disastrous handling of the riots 
and the people’s anger over seeing the country’s military firing on civilian protestors. 
Fortunately for Chávez, the troops he was commanding at that time did not have to fire 
on the protestors and what happened both hardened his resolve to overthrow the 
government and made it more likely that radical change could succeed. In fact, at this 
                                                 
40
 McCaughan 63. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid., 64. 
43
 Lapper 2. 
44
 Ibid.. 
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time it became widely known that Chávez was plotting against the government and he 
was arrested and questioned about his activities but then released.45 
As Venezuela was heading towards the disastrous Caracazo incident and the 
breakdown of the Punto Fijo Pact, Chávez’s desire to become a powerful figure in his 
country continued to build as he received assignments across the country after his 
graduation from the Military Academy. A seminal moment in Chávez’s march to power 
occurred on July 24, 1983 when he and several of his friends created the Bolivarian 
Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario 200) or MBR-200.46 
With the founding of MBR-200, Chávez and his co-conspirators stepped up their efforts 
to build support in the armed services for an eventual coup. Thus, as successive 
governments failed to deal with corruption and lack of services, Chávez became steadily 
more prepared to take advantage of his opponents’ weaknesses. 
Following the 1989 massacre, Chávez was lucky with his military assignments 
and in 1991 he was promoted to the powerful and prestigious position of commander of a 
paratroop battalion.47 This position gave Chávez a strong base in the military to launch a 
coup and put him close to civilian plotters who also wanted to oust President Pérez.48 
Chávez made it clear to the civilian allies, many of whom were members of a left wing 
radical group, La Causa Radical (LCR), that he needed street support when the coup 
started. Unfortunately for Chávez, when he and his military conspirators launched their 
coup on February 4, 1992, they did not get the civilian support they needed. The coup 
failed quickly and Chávez was arrested, but the government made the mistake of granting 
                                                 
45 Marcano 56-57. 
46
 McCaughan 62. 
47
 Marcano 59. 
48
 Ibid., 62. 
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one of his demands.49 That demand was that Chávez be allowed to make a one minute 
televised speech to the nation. Chávez told his stunned countrymen that the coup had 
failed and that he would end it to avoid bloodshed but that “new situations would present 
themselves.”50 This performance made Chávez a folk hero in the country and even 
though Chávez was imprisoned for a short period, his influence on his former military 
colleagues continued to grow. Douglas Schoen and Michael Rowan, fierce critics of 
Chávez, have summarized the impact of his one minute performance: 
With these words Chávez became a repository of hope for the poorest most 
 indignant element of society that long dreamed of sweeping the corrupt white 
 elites out of power and ending crony capitalism and government malfeasance. For 
 the sixty percent of Venezuelans who had told the pollsters they favored a coup, 
 Hugo was now a savior in waiting.51 
 
Remarkably, over the next years neither the Pérez government nor its successors took 
action to eradicate Chávez or his influence, and Chávez later was presented with 
opportunities that allowed him to gain control.  
 
The Rise of Chávez as a Politican 
After the 1992 coup, the Pérez government did little to rebuild  its popularity and, 
instead, continued to foster corruption. These actions and those of Pérez’s successors led 
to a “crisis of governance” because the state “was unable or unwilling to provide for the 
legitimate needs and desires of the Venezuelan people.”52 Meanwhile, Chávez was 
imprisoned for two years for his role in the coup. While in prison, Chávez worked to 
                                                 
49
 McCaughan 67. 
50
 Marcano 74 
51
 Schoen, Douglas and Michael Rowan. The Threat Closer to Home: Hugo Chávez and the War Against 
America. (New York: Free Press, 2009), 39. 
52
 Manwaring 5. 
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critique of the current two party model in Venezuela and to further develop his political 
ideas and alliances.53 Then in 1994 Chávez was released from prison when a new 
President, Rafael Caldera, decided to drop the charges against him.54 
After emerging from prison, Chávez was able to capitalize on the sentiments of 
the people, something the government had failed to do. In this moment of strong 
dissatisfaction and growing anger with the Caldera government, Chávez worked to build 
his already solid support among the lower classes by promising change.55 His demand for 
change resonated in a country that seemed incapable of making progress.  
In 1997 the MBR-200 reorganized into the Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) and 
restructured itself to be more accessible for civilian participation.56 This new political 
party had no negative baggage and the “discrediting of the country’s dominant parties, 
increasing poverty, the weakening of the state’s capacity to govern, and in general, the 
effects of neoliberalism all converged to facilitate the triumph of Chávez as the ‘anti-
candidate’ of the MVR.”57 Driven by his pledge to clean up politics and reform the 
country’s constitution, Chávez won the December 1998 election with a significant 
majority, although voter turnout was only about thirty-five percent.58 
Throughout his campaign for office, Chávez did not forget his roots in the 
military. He constantly reminds his supporters and opposition that “Our movement was 
born in the barracks. That’s a factor we can never forget, it was born there, and its roots 
                                                 
53
 Lapper 2. 
54
 Figueroa 202. 
55
 Manwaring 5. 
56
 Figueroa 202. 
57 Ibid., 203. 
58
 Lapper 2. 
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are there.”59 For example, in the military exercises that he led, Chávez ordered his 
subordinates to begin the day with a quote selected from Bolívar, And this reverence 
towards Bolívar, almost bordering obsession, was a staple of his campaign. 60 Chávez  
never failed to link himself to Bolívar, often quoting him, and using this strong nationalist 
sentiment to gain the support of certain segments of Venezuelan society.61 Thus, Chávez 
ran as both a strong nationalist and as a figure of change, and this combination was very 
appealing. 
Throughout the campaign, poorer Venezuelans viewed Chávez as “savior and 
champion in an impoverished and failing country,” while others, particularly the middle 
class, viewed him “as an altogether more sinister figure. They see him replacing 
democracy with autocracy and a mildly socialist economy with something close to 
Marxist-Leninist communism.”62 Chávez became popular with the masses because he 
was one of them, not a member of the privileged elite. His ability to maximize his 
popularity with the lower classes as well as to gather support from some other elements 
of society, including many of his military colleagues, led to his ascendancy. 
However, when he was elected in 1998, Chávez also garnered at least some 
support from other elements of the Venezuelan population who were ready for a change 
and were “energized by his fiery anti-establishment rheotoric.”63 As one observer has 
                                                 
59
 Krauze Enrique. “The extraordinary career of Venezuela’s radical president Hugo Chávez…” News & 
Views about Venezuela. May 1, 2009.  3. 
60
 Ibid.,12. 
61
 Ibid., 4. 
62
 Manwaring 6. 
63
 Post 4, Marcano 17-18. 
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noted, Chávez and his MVR party “blew apart Venezuela’s corrupt two-party system and 
won the election with fifty-six percent of the vote.”64 
As he had been throughout his military career, Chávez also was lucky in regards 
to the 1998 election. Though Chávez’s campaign faltered towards the end of the race, the 
opposition already had lost too much ground through a series of mistakes to launch a 
successful counter-attack that could overcome Chávez’s advantages as the hero of the 
1992 coup and as a new face on the political scene. Chávez’s campaign was centered on 
the belief that the country wanted more than “just a repudiation of the past;” it wanted a 
candidate who offered a hope for change, and his opponents could not match this 
message.65 Nevertheless, although his opponents united against Chávez by the end of the 
campaign, even Chávez’s campaign chief believed the victory was based “in large part on 
the errors of his opponents.”66  
 In retrospect it is clear that Hugo Chávez was remarkably well positioned to be 
the candidate who could take advantage of years of corruption and ineffective leadership 
of the parties who were part of the Punto Fijo Pact. He was from a lower class but his 
success at the military academy and throughout his military career enabled him to 
influence his contemporaries in the armed forces and younger officers as well. Chávez 
also exhibited a gift for wrapping himself in the Bolivarian tradition and of being a 
natural media performer. Most importantly, he recognized the weaknesses of his enemies 
and exploited these weaknesses. 
 
                                                 
64
 Kozloff, Nikolas. Revolution!: South America and the Rise of the New Left (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), 3. 
65
 Marcano 17. 
66
 Ibid., 18. 
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Chapter 3: Sustaining Power and the Current Situation 
Having been elected by a comfortable margin, Chávez faced the task of following 
through with his promises and implementing his Bolivarian ideals. After this resounding 
victory, he recognized that he would need to quickly consolidate his power before his 
opponents mobilized. In fact: 
When Chávez assumed office in 1998, Venezuela’s displaced political class 
 viewed the arrival of this intruder as a temporary interruption to a long-term 
 power-sharing arrangement. Once Chávez worked out the arithmetic, they 
 believed he would be forced to tone down his rhetoric, cut a deal with the 
 economic elite, and rely on his charisma to keep the disillusioned masses in line.67  
 
However, Chávez has not been a temporary intruder. Instead, he has managed to retain 
power for twelve years through a series of political tactics that have been designed to 
divide and conquer his adversaries and the use of legislative maneuvers that have made 
opposition to Chávez increasingly difficult. Chávez has focused power on himself and 
has created both domestic and international villains who he routinely challenges as a way 
to unify his base of power in the county. He also has punished those who oppose him in 
Venezuela’s traditional power structure: business and financial institutions, the Catholic 
Church, the media, and unions.  
 Chávez has faced major threats to his rule but the most significant started 
in 2001 when political opposition began to mobilize in response to economic reforms 
passed that year. This mobilization came to a head in April 2002 when the opposition 
publicly opposed the government and led vast strikes and protest marches in Caracas that 
centered on Chávez’s efforts to gain further control of the country’s oil resources. 
                                                 
67
 McCaughan 16. 
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Although Chávez instructed the military to stop the opposition protests, the military 
initially refused.68 Only after multiple deaths and the mobilization of Chávez supporters 
did a small number of loyal leaders in the military take control of the situation and 
reinstate Chávez as President.69 Two important consequences arose from this coup. First, 
some leaders in the United States expressed relief that there may be a change in 
Venezuelan leadership when it was reported that Chávez had resigned.70 These comments 
marked the beginning of further deterioration in United States- Venezuelan military 
relations. Second, and more important, Chávez thereafter steadily purged the military of 
his opponents and quickened his efforts to weaken his political opponents.71  
The tactics that Chávez adopted have been described as a system of asymmetric 
conflict that involves the organized application of various techniques aimed at coercing 
and manipulating the population by altering political-psychological factors such as 
“perceptions, beliefs, expectations, legitimacy, and political will.”72 This section details 
the ways in which Hugo Chávez has manipulated oil revenues, attacked the opposition 
and the media, and used governmental processes to sustain his hold on the presidency. 
 
The Importance of the Oil Industry to Chávez’s Power 
In Venezuela the power to control the country starts with the power to control its 
oil reserves. One of the reasons that Hugo Chávez has been able to increase his power in 
the years following his election to the Presidency in 1998 was that he gained almost 
complete control of Venezuela’s greatest resource, it vast oil reserves and production 
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capabilities. Venezuela is now the eighth largest oil exporter in the world.73 Just as now, 
for the past fifty years, the country has been reliant on revenues earned from the sale of 
oil to pay for governmental services and to improve the standard of living of 
its population. In fact, it is estimated that oil currently accounts for ninety percent of the 
value of Venezuela's exports and fifty percent of its budget revenues.74  
Once in office, Chávez moved quickly to use oil revenues to finance his vast 
social agenda. As noted, the use of these revenues to fund the government was not new 
but Chávez’s programs were more wide-ranging and aggressive than the country had 
experienced. He initially created the Consolidated Social Fund (FUS) to “co-ordinate the 
distribution of resources to anti-poverty programs,” and since then his government has 
continued to implement various welfare programs that are designed to pacify and build 
his political base.75 Commentators agree that Chávez’s supporters, at least for the first ten 
years of his rule, have seen tangible results whether it was by learning to read in one of 
the government’s literacy programs, by receiving medical care at a new health clinic, or 
by having land redistributed to them.76 
 Chávez has not been content to merely provide improved services to his core 
constituency; he also has developed programs to make them an even more significant 
force. In fact, through the implementation of “Bolivarian Circles” in December 2001, the 
regime now has more than 2,200,000 citizens who are receiving militia-like training so 
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that they can “defend the Revolution” if necessary.77 According to Dr. Rodrigo Chávez, 
an early coordinator of the circles, they are “the most basic form of participation in the 
democratic process” and the new group has an “express commitment to the defense of the 
revolution.”78 Other Chávez supporters claim that the Bolivarian Circles, like other 
neighborhood and civic groups, also have a humanitarian purpose and serve mainly to 
help assure that the Chávez social programs are shared by all needy Venezuelans.79 The 
Circles and other Chávez organized groups did pour into the streets during the 2002 coup 
and Chávez’s critics believe the real purpose of this group is to intimidate opponents and 
to be able to attack the middle class groups that oppose Chávez.80 What is clear is that 
Chávez has melded this and other citizen groups that are the beneficiaries of his programs 
into an organized group that he controls apart from more formal institutions such as the 
military.81 
The oil sector of the economy is controlled by a state owned oil company, 
Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA). Venezuela first nationalized its oil fields in 1976, 
but for years afterwards the government worked closely with private companies, many of 
them American, to develop the oil fields and to allow private companies a greater stake in 
the business.82 Even in 2002 after Chávez had been in power for several years, although 
“officially owned by the government, PDVSA operated much like a private company and 
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was without a doubt, the lifeblood” of Venezuela's economy.83 Thus, because the oil 
industry was the “crown jewel” of the economy, whoever controlled PDVSA has a huge 
advantage in the fight to control Venezuela.84 Just as it has done with other industries, the 
Chavist government has worked to further nationalize the oil industry, thereby bringing 
this major source of revenue more directly under its control.   
 
Suppressing the Opposition 
One of Chávez’s fiercest challenges has come from Venezuela’s independent 
media. Initially, some media leaders supported Chávez , perhaps with the idea that they 
could win him over and that his rhetoric “belonged to the hot air tradition of previous 
leaders” who soon “discarded populist pledges.”85 During the first years that Chávez was 
in office, there were at least four strong independent news sources that catered to a 
country whose “preferred news source” is television media.86 Chávez has claimed that a 
number of the stations and other media outlets owned by his opponents were instrumental 
in stirring up the protests that led to the aborted 2002 coup.87 Since that time, Chávez has 
increasingly acted to undermine the control of his adversaries and to dominate the news 
and media information that is available to Venezuelans. Initially, he has been successful 
in lessening the number of oppositional voices and in intimidating the remaining media 
who seek to report fairly against his regime.  
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Chávez’s attempts to defuse the opposition media intensified in May 2007 when 
the government refused to renew the license of RCTV, one of the country’s largest and 
most influential television stations.88 The pretext for that decision was that RCTV had not 
sought to renew its concession for the license.89 Over the next several years this type of 
regulatory attack has increased, and laws have been passed which allow the government 
to revoke the licenses of radio and television stations.90 His critics contend that Chávez’s 
plans, which they believe are disguised as an effort to keep stations economically viable, 
will actually force “independent station owners to go off the air, thereby shifting 
dominance to Community Radio, the pro-government chain found by Chávez.”91 Further, 
the laws have been used only against Chávez’s media foes, not against the government 
controlled television station, Venezolana de Television, which airs almost entirely pro-
government programming.92 Although there are still anti-Chávez television and radio 
stations, they are not as strong now as before the 2002 coup, and they are facing 
continued intense pressure to conform to the government’s wishes. 
Another example of Chávez’s suppression of the opposition is his treatment of 
traditional labor groups both before and after a major Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. 
(PDVSA) strike beginning in late 2002. Following the failed coup earlier that year, 
skilled workers at PDVSA began the strike by refusing to continue the production of oil, 
thereby threatening the economic lifeline of the country. Although the refusal to work by 
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these managers and technicians was highly detrimental, a number of unskilled workers 
kept working, and their efforts, combined with support from a number of foreign 
countries including Iran, China, and Brazil allowed the Venezuelan economy to survive.93 
When the government eventually regained control of the situation in March 2003, Chávez 
fired over eighteen thousand workers.94 Yet again, Chávez maintained power and control 
by suppressing the opposition, this time by removing them from their jobs and replacing 
them with loyal supporters.  
 Another traditional source of power in Venezuela is its labor unions led by the 
Workers’ Confederation of Venezuela (CTV). CTV, which was founded in 1936, has a 
long history of uniting the country’s worker, especially in the petroleum industry.95 
However, during the 1990’s, CTV moderated its demands and became less of an 
advocate for the working poor, leading to the unions to be associated with the unpopular 
governments then in power.96 Although some CTV union leaders supported Chávez when 
he campaigned in 1998, many distrusted him and the feeling was mutual. 
 Chávez’s relationship with CTV deteriorated steadily and the union was a leader 
in the strikes that led up to and followed the aborted 2002 coup. Chávez, who had 
declared war on CTV even before the coup, has intensified his efforts to defeat the 
traditional unions since then.97 First, he has attempted to have his supporters elected to 
take control over existing unions by intervening in union elections to favor pro-Chávez 
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candidates.98 Then in 2003 the government established its own labor union, Union 
Nacional de Trabajadores (UNT).99 Indeed, Human Rights Watch has documented that 
the government has established unions for smaller organizations that support Chávez not 
CTV, and that more than seventy-five union leaders have been killed as the new unions 
fight with the old.100 Chávez’s efforts to destroy the old unions are consistent with his 
divide and conquer tactics, and have succeeded, at least until now, in making CTV 
concentrate on its survival rather than on ousting Chávez. 
 As with traditional labor unions, Chávez’s relationship with the historically 
powerful Catholic Church has been extremely rocky. Almost ninety-six percent of all 
Venezuelans are members of the Church, as is Chávez. However, his problems with the 
church have grown, beginning with the championing of abortion rights in the new 
constitution that Chávez pushed through after his election.101 As is typical, Chávez has 
used over-the-top rhetoric to attack the established church, for example declaring that 
Cardinal Ignacio Velasco was “in hell” following his death.102 The church for its part has 
been critical of Chávez’s socialist programs and the upturn in violence in the country. In 
particular, the Catholic leadership fears that Chávez will follow the Cuban model and 
confiscate church property and lessen its role in education.103 Although in his twelve 
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years in power Chávez has not gone that far and it is unclear if he intends to do so, he has 
resorted to his favored tactic of creating competitors for his opponent. Specifically, he 
has supported radical priests who are pushing liberation theology views at the expense of 
the more conservative Catholic Church Episcopal Conference.104 Again, Chávez thus far 
has been relatively successful in his efforts to lessen the ability of the church to help his 
opponents, although the church was seen as helping opponents of Chávez’s Partido 
Socialista Unido party in the recent September 2010 National Assembly elections in 
which the party lost its two-thirds supermajority. 
 
Supporters in Power Positions 
 In addition to suppressing the opposition, another strategy Chávez has employed 
is putting his supporters and those close to him in positions of power. For example, one 
of his brothers is a top banker at Banco Sofitasa and another is now in charge of 
cooperation projects with Cuba.105 Other brothers and relatives have used the Chávez 
name and wealth to win elections, and they currently hold various positions across the 
country.106 Although politicians now ousted from power claim that the Chávez family has 
amassed wealth through illicit dealings, the Chavist-controlled court has cleared them of 
any wrongdoing, even as these family members use their patronage powers to reward 
loyal supporters.107 
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Developing an External Enemy: The United States 
While Chávez has demonized his domestic political opponents, he also has 
created an external enemy, the United States, which he repeatedly denounces as the cause 
of Venezuela’s problems. As mentioned, one of the consequences of the failed coup in 
2002 was a marked deterioration in United States-Venezuelan relations. Although the 
official United States position condemned the coup, earlier American comments that 
appeared to support what was believed to be a change in Venezuelan leadership led 
Chávez to be able to claim that the United States was behind the coup plot.108 
Furthermore, Chávez felt that the Venezuelan opposition was emboldened by this United 
States opposition to Chávez.109 Although the United States tried to dispel the rumors that 
it had actively supported the coup, these rumors have persisted, leading to further 
deterioration in relations between the two nations that Chávez has exploited to his 
advantage. 
Chávez has skillfully depicted the United States as a tormentor who wants to 
interfere in Venezuela and dictate who runs the country. One method Chávez  has used to 
spread his poisonous view of the United States is through the anti-American television 
station “Telesur.”110 This station is broadcasted throughout Latin America and works to 
paint a negative vision of the United States, playing upon the already existing hostile 
attitude of many in the region. 
Chávez also repeatedly paints the United States as a scapegoat during his Sunday 
television show titled “Alo Presidente.”111 During this show, which typically lasts a 
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minimum of five hours, Chávez’s ministers sit dressed in the red of the Venezuelan 
Bolivarian Revolution while Chávez talks about his early life, his musings on world 
politics, the political direction of Venezuela, and whatever else he feels inspired to 
discuss.112 A constant theme of the program is that the United States is responsible for the 
ills of Venezuela and that only Hugo Chávez can stand up to the Yankee menace. 
Thus, Chávez consistently uses anti-American fervor to externalize Venezuela’s 
internal problems. He constantly warns of potential United States aggression towards 
Venezuela. In February 2005, Chávez stated, “The only destabilizing factor here [in 
Venezuela] is [U.S. President George W.] Bush.”113 Later, in March 2005, he asserted 
that the United States was planning to assassinate him and that only God could save 
Venezuela and the world from the United States threat.114 By whipping up anti-American 
sentiment, Chávez has been able to deflect a close analysis of his failures and create a 
perceived threat that unifies many of his countrymen. 
 
Neutralizing the Foreign Media 
Just as Chávez has recognized that control of Venezuela’s domestic media is 
crucial to his ability to sustain power, so too has he tried to control how he is represented 
in the international press, particularly the United States media. Since taking office, 
Chávez has arranged for a flood of sympathetic American politicians and public figures 
to visit his country. Politically, those visitors have included Congressman John Conyers 
and fifteen other members of the Congressional Black Caucus as well as Dennis 
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Kucinich.115 Indeed, Kucinich even went on record as stating that Venezuela under 
Chávez is a “model democracy.”116 This is the same position taken by former President 
Jimmy Carter, a frequent visitor to Venezuela, who has praised Chávez on many 
occasions for creating “a pure brand of democracy.”117 
Shrewdly recognizing the appeal of celebrities to average Americans, Chávez also 
has cultivated support from movie stars and other pop culture figures. As authors Douglas 
Schoen and Michael Rowan have reported:  
Many Hollywood stars and others in the entertainment industry are known for 
their left-of-center views, and are not exactly notorious for any rigorous analysis 
underlying those views. Hence it is no surprise that the stars have flocked to 
Chávez’s side. But their sheer number is nonetheless impressive. Unlike 
intellectuals and even activists, big stars reach millions of people, and the media 
often hangs on their words without question.118 
 
Hollywood personalities such as Danny Glover, Kevin Spacey, and Sean Penn all have 
been enlisted by Chávez as part of his efforts to mold American public opinion.119 
Chávez’ appeal to left wing Americans is not limited to politicians or celebrities. 
Over the past decade of his presidency, numerous books written by Americans have 
appeared that praise Chávez and contrast him to President George W.  Bush, whose eight 
year Presidency overlapped with a large portion of Chávez’s reign. One example of this a 
memoir written by a former Maryknoll Catholic missionary, Charles Hardy. In that book, 
Cowboy in Caracas: A North American’s Memoir of Venezuela’s Democratic Revolution, 
Hardy idolizes Chávez and what he has done for the common man in Venezuela. One 
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quote from Hardy’s book about Chávez’s election to the Presidency is indicative of the 
over-the-top praise that Chávez has cultivated from this type of opinion maker:   
The elections were held on December 6, 1998, and when the results started to 
indicate that Chávez had clearly won, there was rejoicing in the street. The sky 
was full of fireworks. The air was full of music. The impossible had happened. If 
someone were to ask me if I had ever seen a miracle in my lifetime, I would 
surely respond that it was the election of Hugo Chávez as president of 
Venezuela.120 
 
Chávez’s United States media strategy initially was successful in gaining the 
support or at least acceptance of many Americans, which achieved Chávez’s goal of 
making it difficult for the George W. Bush Administration to engage in anti-Chávez 
efforts. Indeed, Chávez’s apparent success with his media manipulation may be credited 
to the fact that its chief target was President Bush. By often painting Bush, rather than the 
United States, as the target of his populist rage, Chávez shrewdly played on the feelings 
of many liberals, particularly as Bush’s popularity plummeted due to the war in Iraq. This 
permitted Chávez to paint Bush as a demon in Venezuela while at the same time making 
himself appear to be a reasonable person to those who were willing listen to him in the 
United States. However, as Anne Applebaum noted in an article for Slate, the Hollywood 
embrace of Chávez was likely more a reflection of Hollywood’s desire to seem 
revolutionary:  
Just as sympathetic foreigners whom Lenin called “useful idiots” once supported 
Russia abroad, their modern equivalents provide the Venezuelan president with 
legitimacy, attention, and good photographs. He, in turn, helps them overcome the 
frustration … of living in an annoyingly unrevolutionary country where people 
have to change things by law... For all of his wealth, fame, media access and 
Hollywood power, Sean Penn cannot oust George W. Bush. But by showing up in 
the company of Chávez he can at least get a lot more attention for his opinions.121  
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Now, George W. Bush is gone, and America’s liberal elite seem less willing to 
join Chávez in castigating President Obama. Unfortunately, for many years this strategy 
was successful, perhaps because “the story of Chávez  as a social revolutionary finally 
redressing the injustices created by centuries of oppression fits nicely into traditional 
stereotypes of the region, reinforcing the view that Latin American underdevelopment is 
due to the vices of the predatory governing classes.”122 Thus, the days when Chávez 
could easily manipulate Hollywood stars and liberal Congressman may be over and the 
general mood of America is much less open to this sort of tactic. 
Additionally, over the years that he has been in power, Chávez has attempted to 
favorably influence United States’ opinion not just through the words of others, but also 
through direct, high profile actions. Specifically, he has used CITGO, the American 
branch of PDVSA which operates more than 14,000 retail gasoline stations in the United 
States, to distribute low cost heating oil to needy Americans. The program started in 2003 
and has been conducted in conjunction with a non-profit group led by Joe Kennedy, the 
son of Robert Kennedy.123 As described by Chávez on CITGO’s web site, “We are all 
americanos, and together we share the Bolivarian mission of giving hope and a better life 
to the poorest and most vulnerable—whether they live in Venezuela or Vermont. Our oil 
revenues are bringing literacy, health care and job training to millions of Venezuelans 
and it is our wish to extend this prosperity throughout the hemisphere.”124 
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Chávez failed to note, as did Kennedy, that one reason for the rising oil prices at 
the time the program was adopted was Chávez’s efforts to inflate the price of oil.125 
 Further, while this program certainly benefits sectors of society in the United States, 
Chávez neglects the impact this program has on Venezuela. Although his missions had 
early successes they have proven to be unsustainable due to the decline in oil prices, and 
millions of Venezuela’s citizens live in poverty. Additionally, because of this decline in 
worldwide oil prices worldwide, this American heating oil initiative had to be halted in 
2009.126 Although there are plans to restart the program in the future, in a phone 
conversation with a program employee on November 13, 2010, the employee stated that 
there is no predicted timeline of this restart. Thus, the current world economic crisis is 
working not just to increase Chávez’s troubles within Venezuela but also to undermine 
his attempts to project and retain international power.    
 
Constitutional Changes, Reforms, and Referendums 
The basis of the opposition’s displeasure with Chávez is due to his massive 
changes in the role of the government and his implemented policies. When he came to 
power, Chávez initiated a series of referendums and elections on various pieces of 
legislation intended to radically change Venezuela and how it is governed. The first 
major change was the adoption of a new constitution in 1999. Indeed, within a day after 
his election, President Chávez decreed the calling of a referendum to elect delegates to an 
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assembly to draft a new constitution.127 His group of candidates prevailed in the vote in 
July 1999 and prepared the draft of the constitution that was soundly approved by the 
voters in December 1999. This new constitution gave extensive powers to the President 
and enabled Hugo Chávez to vigorously pursue his plan to implement a Bolivarian social 
revolution.  
Though these reforms were advertised as making the government more 
transparent, the result according to critics has been a more opaque, less representative 
government.128 For example, two representative, theoretically independent bodies, the 
judiciary and the central electoral council, were filled with Chávez’s supporters and the 
size of the judiciary was even increased to make room for its new leftist members.129 
Additionally, the legislature has lost much of its control over government finances.130 
Also, the government “put limits on the advantages that had been previously offered to 
foreign capital by state enterprises” while “simultaneously demanding to private 
employers that it grant greater concessions to labor, particularly in terms of wages.”131 
The adoption of these reforms helped Chávez to achieve one of the main goals of his 
Bolivarian program: changing the political system to decrease the power of the elites.  
 Although a strong majority supported these reforms during the early years of the 
Chávez administration, these measures have provoked a growing opposition. Initially, 
demonstrations “against the government were growing in frequency, magnitude and 
aggressiveness during the course of 2001.”132 This unrest eventually led to the failed coup 
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attempt on April 11, 2002. Two important opposition groups emerged during this short-
lived attempt to oust Chávez. First, part of the military, up until this point one of 
Chávez’s strongest support groups, joined the opposition.133 Second, many in the middle 
class who previously had supported Chávez, gravitated towards the opposition, because 
they felt the government had consistently neglected their interests.134 
Following the coup of 2002 and the PDVSA strike in late 2002 and early 2003, 
there was increased political unrest across Venezuela. The Organization of American 
States (OAS), in particular Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, and the United States, 
urged Chávez to resolve the conflict and restore order through democratic means.135 
Bowing to political pressure, Chávez agreed to hold a recall referendum in 2004. Prior to 
agreeing to this referendum, he and his supporters did everything they could to win the 
support of the masses and to prevent a nationwide vote that could have ended his rule. 
One way they did this was by targeting the lower classes and their communities, 
historically his main support base, with vast new social programs designed to redistribute 
wealth and services.  
Specifically, in late 2003 Chávez launched a series of social programs, known as 
“misiones,” the Spanish word for “missions.” These missions are financed by oil profits 
and include such ventures as importing Cuban doctors in exchange for giving Cuba a 
lower price on oil.136 “Although many experts doubt their efficacy as sustainable 
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improvers of social indicators, Chávez’s missions have “palliated the pains of poverty 
and proven prodigiously profitable in ideological and electoral terms.”137 
Though some in the lower classes have benefitted from these programs, others see 
significant long-term flaws. For example, many Venezuelan doctors have immigrated to 
other countries because they cannot earn a decent salary in their home country due to the 
influx of Cuban doctors.138 However, a large number of Chávez’s supporters who have 
benefitted and continue to benefit from these programs have remained supportive of 
Chávez, because he has increased their standard of living.  
In an effort to garner their support in the 2004 referendum, Chávez continued to 
increase spending on these programs throughout the year.139 Additionally, just before the 
referendum, he gave voting rights to nearly a million Colombian immigrants in order to 
garner their support.140 These efforts helped increase his base of support and the outcome 
of the 2004 recall referendum was a 59.25% to 40.74% win for Chávez. In fact, “Chávez 
won the referendum designed to oust him by a greater percentage than that which he 
obtained in 2000 when elected under the terms of the Bolivarian Constitution.”141  
More economic reforms implemented in 2005 worked to further strengthen 
Chávez’s hold over Venezuela. Early that year, land deemed “unproductive” by the 
government was appropriated.142 In fact, even though the 1999 Constitution guarantees 
property rights, since Chávez has come to power about seven and one half million acres 
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have been “rescued” by the government.143 However, although popular with his 
supporters, the expropriation of these vast areas of agricultural land and the resulting 
chaos has led to the decrease in output of traditional crops- sugar, rice, fruit, vegetables- 
and the increase in imports.144 For example, in 2009 imports of food and agricultural 
products totaled seven billion dollars, an increase from the one and a half billion in 
1998.145 It is true that some statistics indicate that this expropriation and redistribution 
has benefitted over 116,000 families; however, it is likely that these figures have been 
inflated.146 Tellingly, a large part of Venezuela’s seven billion dollars of food and 
agricultural products in 2009 were purchased by the government. Due to corruption and 
incompetence within the government, of these imports “at least 130,000 ton of food was 
left to rot in containers.”147 
In addition to appropriating private land, Chávez has ordered and the Chavist 
courts have supported the appropriation of industrial companies, urban land, and public 
buildings, “citing everything from the national interest to cultural and historical 
significance.”148 One example of an industry that was nationalized in this period is Sidor, 
an iron and steel complex, which years before had been changed from a public entity into 
a private company. Two years post re-nationalization, poor management and electricity 
rationing had led to a fifty percent decline in this business’ production.149 
Likewise, when oil contracts were renegotiated in 2005. third-parties were 
ushered out and the government began working solely with PDVSA, which came under 
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the direct control of the government.150 Commentators believe this direct government 
control made the dealings of PDVSA even less transparent and further allowed Chávez to 
direct vast sums towards the missions that benefitted his supporters.151 
Further, throughout his years in power, Chávez’s government has increased its 
control over the banking sector. Following the implementation of interest rate caps in 
2004, in 2005 the Chávez government placed government appointed directors on the 
boards of the country’s banks.152 Again, this direct control over a key economic sector 
has provided opportunities for Chávez to reward his supporters and punish his enemies.  
Though these wide-sweeping changes arguably attained some short-term success, 
at least for Venezuela’s poorest citizens, they also have led to long term troubles. 
Primarily, since Chávez gained power, the country has become much more dependent on 
oil revenues because much of the profits from the sale of oil are spent on politically 
motivated missions. While these programs may deliver some benefits, they are a large 
drain on not necessarily renewable resources. As Oscar García Mendoza, then president 
of the private bank Banco Venezolano de Credito, warned in 2008, “This country will be 
paralyzed because it is so dependent on petroleum.”153 Further, “seizures of rural estates 
[had the effect of] weakening agricultural output and nationalizations scare[d] away 
foreign investors.154 
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This oil dependence and lack of other sources of capital have proved to be a 
challenge for Venezuela during the recent economic downturn and most likely will 
continue to plague the country at least in the near future. Another Venezuelan expert 
warns, “even a modest fall in the oil prices towards levels quite typical during the early 
part of the decade will increase Venezuela’s economic problems significantly.”155 
Additionally, to support social programs, which are crucial for Chávez to maintain 
power, the government must turn to in-country borrowing to finance its fiscal deficit. 
However, besides the oil sector, there is very little investment available to counterbalance 
the deteriorating infrastructure across the country.156 
The declining economic situation has already begun to erode Chávez’s power. For 
example, in a December 2007 vote on Chávez’s proposed constitutional changes, his 
proposed changes were rejected. In part this was due to the large scale mobilization of the 
opposition, but also, some Chavistas abstained from voting. The reasons for their 
abstention varied: 
Some abstained because they did not wish to give the president a blank check, 
 others because they wanted to express their dissatisfaction with the government’s 
 inability to solve particular problems, and still others because they objected in 
 general to “Bolivarian socialism.”157 
 
As will be discussed, some subsequent elections arguably have been more favorable for 
Chávez, but this 2007 loss marks an important moment: the first mainstream showing of 
dissension within Chávez’s core supporters. 
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As oil prices surged upward from 2004 to 2008, even allowing for a government 
overstatement of figures, the Venezuelan economy grew at a high rate.158 There was a 
marked decrease in unemployment and poverty and an increase in salaries. This 
economic picture favored Chávez and he took credit for the good economy. However, in 
2008 these positive gains began to be offset by the international economic crisis, but by 
the time of the November 2008 elections, the effects of the downward economy spiral 
had not yet begun to affect the Venezuelan population.159 In those elections, Chavist 
candidates won 53 % of the regional elections, though some popular opposition 
candidates were ruled ineligible for election by the comptroller of the Republic, a Chavist 
loyalist.160 
After maintaining a majority in the 2008 regional elections, the next important 
referendum vote for the government took place on February 15, 2009. A fifty-five 
percent majority followed Chávez’s lead and voted to eliminate term limits for elected 
offices, thereby clearing Chávez to run for reelection in 2012.161 This outcome marked a 
huge backwards step for democracy in Venezuela. To many people, this result clearly 
raised the question of whether Venezuela truly is democratic or whether it is on the road 
to totalitarianism. In fact, due to the increasingly authoritarian state in Venezuela, 
Freedom House no longer includes this country as one of the world’s electoral 
democracies.162 
 However, these fears have been somewhat dampened by the results of the recent 
elections of National Assembly members that were held in September 2010. In that 
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election, Chávez’s PSU won ninety-four of the one hundred sixty-five seats on the 
Assembly, though this was less than the “two-thirds supermajority that would give them 
untrammeled parliamentary control.”163 To combat this ability of the opposition, 
Democratic Unity, to stall Chávez-inspired legislation, Chávez apparently plans to 
transfer greater power to the local governments controlled by PSU.164 
  Thus, after twelve years, Hugo Chávez remains in power in Venezuela. He and 
his political party have used their increased control over PDVSA and other economic 
sectors to generate revenues that then support social programs that benefit Chávez’s core 
supporters, the lower classes. However, the nationalization of these key industries has 
made them less efficient and has prevented them from modernizing because they are 
being stripped of their revenues so that Chávez  can support his political agenda. Chávez 
also has succeeded in weakening key opposition groups and reducing the power of 
traditional Venezuelan groups such as labor unions, and the Catholic Church. He has 
managed to keep his supporters focused on external enemies rather than internal 
problems, but the current world economic slump has created conditions that may lead to 
problems in the future.  
 At least on the surface, “Chávez has been savvy in taking advantage of frequent 
elections to give his regime a plebiscitary character.”165 However, there is low 
accountability and transparency in the government. Some observers believe the 
Venezuelan state has become an “electoral authoritarian” regime, outwardly satisfying 
electoral requirements of inclusion, pluralism, and competitiveness, but wrought with 
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systematic governmental manipulation.166 Additionally, there is evidence of election 
bribes by high-level employees and state officials.167 In a state that controls everything, it 
is questionable whether the people will still continue to have a voice in the affairs of the 
government. 
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Chapter 4: Rising Threats 
Because Chávez has been using his political power to support the lower classes, 
their economic interests are now being at least partially realized.168 As one author argues, 
“an inclusive democracy is clearly taking place in the country.”169 While it is certainly 
true that the government is more inclusive with regards to the masses, it is important to 
question whether or not this democracy is more exclusive to the middle and upper classes 
who still have the ability to assert their power if forced to do so. Indeed, rather than 
working to promote full participation, Chávez has worked to keep his largest group of 
supporters satisfied in order to encourage their political participation while attempting to 
marginalize his opponents.  
As one author notes, “the struggle over the distribution of economic surplus, in 
this case, the rents produced by petroleum, has become plainly revealed as a fundamental 
part of the struggle for this new democracy.”170 Although the pre-Chavist governments 
leaned too far towards an oligarchical upper class structure, it is arguable that the Chavist 
government leans too far towards the popular masses to be considered an inclusive 
democracy. However, this power model was built on surpluses in oil profits, and with the 
drastic decrease in these funds, the Chavist government’s ability to rely on this traditional 
source of power may be limited, and Chávez’s ability to find new sources to maintain his 
power may also be limited. 
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Catholic Church  
As noted, the predominant religion in Venezuela is Roman Catholicism, and for 
hundreds of years, the Catholic Church has been one of the most powerful institutions in 
the country. For that reason, it is not surprising that its leadership has clashed with Hugo 
Chávez as he has tried to consolidate and increase his power. The friction between the 
government and the church has steadily increased over the last several years as Chávez’s 
efforts to increase his power and develop revenue sources to fund his social programs 
have become bolder. The clashes center around concerns that just as Chávez has 
nationalized businesses and financial institutions, so too will the government confiscate 
church property in order to raise funds.171 Additionally, many conservative leaders of the 
church believe that Chávez’s totalitarian model for socialism is at odds with both the 
country's traditional values and the teachings of the church.172  
In the early years of his rule, Chávez seemed to be more careful when disagreeing 
with the Catholic hierarchy. Instead, he relied on the Church and did not overtly try to 
cross Church officials. However, now that the hostilities are increasing, it is possible that 
the Church, which has multitudes of devoted followers throughout the country, may 
prove a significant opponent to Chávez as he tries to maintain power.  
 
Unions 
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Although CTV does not currently wield the same level of power it did before 
Chávez’s election, it is still a powerful force within the country and millions of workers 
still support it. The efforts of Chávez to marginalize CTV have made its leaders fierce 
opponents. Just like the Catholic Church leaders, the heads of traditional unions may be 
able to galvanize opposition to Chávez in this period of economic difficult. 
 
Military 
As in other South American countries, the military establishment is a traditional 
source of power in Venezuela. As noted, the Venezuelan military has always had a cadre 
of officers with backgrounds like that of Chávez, and his experience in the military as 
well as his connection with like minded officers has helped Chávez build and retain his 
position. However, not all of Venezuela’s top military leaders have supported Chávez 
since his election to the presidency in 1998. As seen, a number of generals were involved 
in the abortive 2002 coup. Since that failed attempt to drive Chávez from power, he has 
attempted to cleanse the military of leaders who might challenge him.173 He has culled 
“hundreds of officers deemed to be disloyal” while simultaneously promoting those who 
support him.174 Nevertheless, further changes within the military may cause further 
discontent with Chávez’s leadership. 
Specifically, in addition to building a core leadership group that supports his 
retention of power, Chávez also has made significant changes in the role of the military in 
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order to make it an ally, rather than a foe, in the event of a battle for power. One 
significant change has been the diversion of the military from its traditional defense 
functions to work in social projects organized by the government as part of Chávez’s Plan 
Bolivar 200.175 According to commentators friendly to Chávez, the military was the sole 
institution in Venezuela which could help implement this perceived social progress, and 
the “Venezuelan armed forces, especially the junior officers, took on “ tasks such as 
building schools and infrastructure building projects “with enthusiasm.176” As part of this 
structural shift, the army’s name has been changed to the Bolivarian Armed Forces and 
its soldiers must shout the slogan “Homeland, socialism or death!”177 Ultimately, whether 
this enthusiasm is real is unclear. 
By involving the military in these social projects, Chávez has pushed to the 
sidelines the traditional heads of such projects, the governors of the states in which the 
projects occur.178 Instead of looking to their governor as the leader and driver of social 
progress in the region, the masses are now looking at the military. Since state power is 
now beginning to revolve around the civil-military elite, governmental power is 
becoming centralized in the hands of Chávez’s supporters.179 This policy of reducing the 
power of regional authorities in the end may haunt Chávez because it could foster a belief 
that the central government is overlooking the needs of its distinct regions. 
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Further, Chávez has built up a separate, civilian defense force, based on a Cuban 
model. This force, intended to help repel foreign invaders, is likely also intended to bring 
thousands of lightly armed and minimally trained civilians into the streets in the event 
that Chávez is challenged. The militia allows Chávez gives him a level of basic control in 
the cities, but also gives him a counter-balance if “unhappy generals” seek to depose 
him.180 This vast and nontraditional military organization is a huge change from previous 
military practice, and it could become an irritant to military leaders should Chávez’s 
popularity weaken and the military have to choose a side to support in a power struggle. 
Chávez also has implemented changes to Venezuela’s basic military doctrine that 
may prove to be unpopular with many military officers. In keeping with Chávez’s violent 
anti-American crusade, Venezuela adopted a new doctrine in 2005 that focuses not on the 
defense of Venezuela from its neighbors or guerilla groups, but rather on the United 
States as its main enemy.181 One of the conditions of this new focus is that the armed 
forces must be prepared to wage an asymmetric conflict against the United States.182 This 
has led to the use of Cuban advisors for the military and defense ties with traditional 
American foes such as China and Russia.183 These new alliances are so foreign to 
Venezuela’s historical model that they too may lessen Chávez’s support in the military 
over time. 
Recently, there has been evidence that Chávez is concerned about his grip on the 
military and is taking steps to bolster his position with it. Specifically, Chávez promoted 
General Henry Rangel Silva to be the General-in–Chief of the Armed Forces. General 
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Silva, a Chávez loyalist and political force, may well have risen to this position more 
because of his friendship and support of Chávez than because of his military abilities.184 
In fact, Silva has proclaimed that if Chávez were to lose an election, the result would be 
unpalatable and might not be accepted by the military.185 
Currently, there is speculation that Chávez’s increased support for his loyalists in 
the military also stems from a fear that these friends might be involved in the corruption 
scandal of captured drug king Walid Makled. It is believed that Makled, who is now in 
Colombian custody, may testify that he had dealings with Silva and other high ranking 
pro-Chávez officials.186 By promoting these officials, Chávez hopes to gain their support 
and silence. Although Colombia recently agreed to extradite Makled to Venezuela in 
2011, the prospects that Chávez and his cronies could be implicated in drug dealings 
threatens to destabilize his hold on the military. 
 
Fluctuations in Oil Prices 
Although in the past Hugo Chávez has been able to use oil revenues to fund social 
programs, thereby helping the poor in the country, his main source of support, the source 
of those revenues is being increasingly challenged. First, the steep decline in world oil 
prices over the past several years has lessened the revenue stream considerably. Although 
it is true that world prices move in cycles, the current decline comes at a crucial time for 
Chávez. Both his countrymen and foreigners are beginning to question the changes he has 
made in Venezuela, and if the social programs dry up without a constant stream of new 
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revenue, it is unlikely his presidency will be looked upon as favorably, even by his core 
supporters. 
A second and perhaps more important long term problem is the decrease in 
investment in the improvements of oil under Hugo Chávez. Because of the pressure on 
PDVSA to devote its resources to keeping Chávez’s missions operating, its investment in 
technology and production improvements has decreased. Unsurprisingly, this diminished 
investment is likely to “further inhibit production capacity and reduce the efficiency of 
operations.”187 Further, PDVSA still has not recovered from the politically motivated 
firings of over 18, 000 workers following the failed 2002 coup. Instead, these trained 
workers have been replaced largely by Chávez’s political supporters intent on meeting 
government objectives.188 The problems of PDVSA are a ticking time bomb for Chávez, 
and it is an open question as to whether he can defuse them. 
 
Crime Rate 
Another rising challenge facing Venezuela which threatens the continued support 
of the current government is the drastic increase in violent crimes. Since Chávez came to 
power in 1999, there have been approximately 118,541 homicides, with 43,792 of those 
occurring since 2007.189 Though the government has stopped officially releasing this 
data, the Venezuelan Violence Observatory group has been tracking the statistics based 
on police files.190 According to experts, there are various reasons for this surge; however, 
a main reason, unsurprisingly, is the depressed economy. Although public spending is 
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largely based on social services such as the missions, the Venezuelan economy has 
continued to shrink and the inflation rate has grown to over thirty percent per year.191 
 Another fear for the country is the impact Chávez’s governmental referendums 
and reforms have had on the increase in crime. As discussed earlier, referendums have 
led to the loss of an independent judicial system. Many experienced state employees who 
have disagreed with Chávez have had to leave their jobs, and sometimes even the 
country, out of fear of retribution.192 An example of Chávez’s affinity for ousting his 
opponents, no matter how qualified, occurred last December, when he “jailed Judge 
Maria Lourdes Afiuni after she conditionally freed a businessman who had been 
imprisoned without trial for nearly three years in violation of Venezuela’s own laws and 
international human rights principles.”193 Further: 
Six months ago, the Organization of American States’ Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights issued a report that found that basic principles of 
democracy and human rights are violated regularly in Venezuela. Since then, 
things have only gotten worse: The murder rate is soaring. Two bloggers were 
arrested for tweets they posted, with threats of further Internet censorship. A 
presidential decree has created a Center for Situation Studies of the Nation with 
broad censorship powers.194 
 
 Likewise, the increase of censorship has begun to cause the public to question the 
government’s ability to deal with the crime problems. The failure of the government to 
control crime over time could lead to a loss of confidence in Chávez, thereby impacting 
his ability to retain power Earlier this year, a leading independent newspaper, El 
Nacional, published a front-page photograph showing “a dozen homicide victims strewn 
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about the city’s largest morgue.”195 This gory picture chronicles one of the many 
examples of the violence is tearing apart the country. Almost as bad as the impact of the 
photograph was the government’s handling of the situation. Rather than making a 
government announcement vowing to actively work to decrease the crime rate, the 
Chavist-controlled court ordered El Nacional to stop printing images of violence, leading 
many to fear that the government is focusing on the messenger rather than ons the root 
cause of the issue.196  
 One area particularly fraught with crime is Chávez’s hometown of Barinas, an 
area that has historically been a hotbed of support for the President. In this state, the 
kidnapping rate is 7.2 per 100,000 inhabitants, much higher than the nationwide average 
of two abductions per 100,000.197 With only a fraction of kidnappings resulting in prison 
sentences, there is little deterrence for committing this crime, particular as poverty and 
economic polarization is on the rise.198 One Barinas business man, who was abducted in 
2008, remarks, “Our ruling dynasty is effectively telling us we are expendable… The 
only other plausible theory is that they are too inebriated by power to notice the 
emergency at their feet.”199 The failure to address the high crime and kidnapping rates is 
causing Chávez to lose support in his hometown, the very place that was once a bastion 
of support, and it is symptomatic of the unraveling of the government’s ability to deliver 
the basic services that the electorate expects. 
 
A Need for Change 
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Finally, it is plausible that Chávez might lose power because his countrymen are 
tired of the same leadership and want change. A recent example of this phenomenon 
occurred in the 2008 and 2010 elections in the United States, when Americans 
demonstrated that a powerful political force can be generated by voters’ desire to change 
the status quo. Conversely, Chávez’s idol Fidel Castro has managed to remain in power 
for fifty years. However, Cuba truly is a totalitarian state in which elections are 
meaningless and their result is predetermined. Although the voting record in Venezuela 
may not be free of corruption, elections do still matter. 
Some interesting evidenceof a potential desire for change emerged in the 
February 15, 2009, referendum. Positively for Chávez, “his charisma and ability to 
mobilize the chavista grassroots- along with the economic and social policies that he has 
pursued in recent years- continue to win him widespread support.”200 However, it has 
been alleged that this affirmative election outcome was aided by two factors: election 
fraud and a failure on the part of the opposition to mobilize.201 As long as Chávez is in 
power, there is likely to be governmental interference in the elections in order to sustain 
his power. However, what is notable is that as this interference has seemingly increased, 
his margin of success has seemingly decreased.; indeed, Chávez’s party did not do as 
well as expected in the September 2010 National Assembly election. If the opposition can 
effectively mobilize and unify, even election fraud may not save Chávez’s presidency. In 
the end, Chávez’s undoing may the public’s impatience with his constant drama and 
frenzied activity or the continuing bad economy and corruption, leading the masses to 
seek a new leader. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Since he won the 1998 presidential election, Hugo Chávez’s has been a highly 
controversial leader. As one critic states:  
Chávez does not act like the president of Venezuela; he acts like its owner. He is 
 the proprietor of his public office, the CEO of state enterprises that answer to no 
 laws of transparency and accountability, the big and indiscriminate spender of oil 
 revenues, the  supreme leader of a legislative assembly and tribunal of justice that 
 is supposed to serve  as a check and balance, the head of an attorney-general’s 
 office that is supposed to oversee his actions.202  
 
To the lower classes and other groups who had no power under the previous oligarchic 
leaders from the upper class, this strife is welcome because he has shown that the 
previously ruling elites can be deflated. However, this style also has been deeply 
polarizing for the country and has caused a violent reaction against Chávez and his 
government by many powerful forces.  
When Hugo Chávez was elected as Venezuela's President in 1998, few observers 
believed that he would be able to govern the country effectively or to remain in power. 
Many viewed him as an arrogant man from the country who would be unable to deal with 
the complexities of governing the country. However, Chávez, a champion of populist 
causes, has confounded his critics and defied the predictions that he would be swept aside 
quickly by more experienced politicians or his foes in the Venezuelan military. Indeed, 
he survived an abortive coup in 2002 and since then has been able to consolidate his 
power at home and his international reputation as a thorn in the side of the United States.  
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Chávez gained power by forging a political party that played on the many years of 
corruption of the leaders of the country. His popularity increased after his role in the 1992 
coup attempt, and following his 1994 release from prison, he worked to develop his ties 
to various anti-government political groups as well as to develop grassroots support 
among the poorer classes of society. This “charming, folksy, flirtatious” politician forged 
an effective organization that developed support among Venezuela’s many poor and 
native groups by promising radical social change and wealth redistribution.203 He learned 
how to manipulate the media, by focusing its attention on external enemies, in order to 
distract the nation from the government’s economic failures. Chávez has skillfully taken 
advantage of Venezuela’s great oil wealth to fuel his short term ambitions and to fund 
programs for the poor. However, these programs drain the current revenue from natural 
resource exploitation and thus are unsustainable in the long term, as proved by the recent 
downturn in the price of oil. Additionally, the public may be tiring of Chávez’s 
unchangingly brash persona after twelve years, particularly as problems life the increase 
in crime multiplies. 
Chávez has managed to harness the polarization in the country to his advantage 
and to hold off and diminish the power of his opponents, including many elements of the 
business community, the Catholic Church, the unions, and traditional sources of power 
and influence in the country. Chávez, who served in the military from 1971 until he took 
part in a failed coup in 1992, also has been able to use the military to his advantage by 
systematically replacing unfriendly officers with loyal supporters. To counter the 
                                                 
203
 Rosenberg, Tina. "The Perils of Petrocracy." The New York Times Magazine. Nov. 4, 2007. Accessed 
on October 18, 2010.  http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/04/magazine/04oil-t.html?pagewanted=all. 1. 
56 
 
 
opposition in these popular institutions, Chávez has either used the age old technique of 
firing adversaries and replacing them or he has created entirely new rival institutions. 
Hugo Chávez’s rule in Venezuela has been characterized by the “high 
concentration of power in the president’s hands, the elimination of boundaries between 
the military and civil sectors, and the direct subjugation of military personnel to the 
president’s authority.”204 Though initially he achieved many successes, the recent 
downturn in the international economy has shown that many of his policies are 
unsustainable. Hugo Chávez’s short term outlook led to his initial and sustained success 
but this same outlook could inevitably lead to his downfall. A convergence of factors, 
including the prospect of continued economic stagflation, the corruption of the Chávez 
regime, and the government’s inability to deliver basic services, may be what Chávez’s 
many foes need to oust him. If so, he will be beaten by the same problems that he 
capitalized on during his 1998 election.  
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